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Abstract
We view the ranking of individual rights as the ranking of the opportunity 
sets. Our social welfare function is a binary relation over social states. A social 
state is determined by an opportunity set and an outcome in the opportunity set. 
Based on simple axioms, we characterize the extended individual preferences 
over social states. To prove an impossibility theorem in this framework, we must 
revise some classical conditions. We introduce a new condition, which is called 
the consistency condition, on the social welfare function.
1  Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine Arrow’s general impossi-
bility theorem extending the domain of the social welfare function con-
sidering individual rights. In the traditional welfare economic theory, 
only one informational foundation, which is individual preferences 
over outcomes, determines social state evaluations. However, there are 
many objections against this approach depending exclusively on indi-
vidual preferences, such as Pattanaik and Xu (1990, 1998) and Puppe 
(1996). They assert that the informational foundation of normative eco-
nomics should be expanded so that the non-utility information should 
be properly taken into account. Sen (1970) made one of the earliest at-
tempts to introduce the value of individual liberty formally as the non-
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utility information. He proved the logical incompatibility between the 
libertarian claim of rights and Pareto efficiency. There have been many 
discussions on this Sen’s paradox. One of the most heated debates was 
on the legitimacy of Sen’s formulation of the libertarian rights. It was 
Robert Nozick (1974) who proposed deontological formulation of lib-
ertarian rights as an alternative to Sen’s libertarian rights. He views 
individual rights as the complete freedom of choice without interference 
by others. Accepting this notion, there have been some recent attempts 
viewing the individual rights as the opportunity for the person, such as 
Pattanaik and Xu (1990, 1998) and Puppe (1996). These attempts formu-
late rules for judging the degrees of freedom of choice viewing this as the 
opportunity for the individual. However, this approach is nothing but an 
approach capturing one aspect of individual rights. This is why it may be 
impossible to isolate individuals’ environments sufficiently to guarantee 
that each has all the control over his or her personal life in some situation. 
Accepting this observation, we focus on the kind of feature of rights that is 
closely related to the social structure in terms of individual rights. Individ-
ual rights are determined not only by the feature, as the view of Sen (1970) 
or Nozick (1974), of self-control without interference by others, but also (in 
the complex interdependencies among individuals) the feature of social-
control. Our concept of social-control focues on how much freedom the the 
society or community has. To illustrate the importance of this concept, con-
sider the example used in Suzumura (1999). Suppose a father is to divide a 
cake among three children fairly. There are two methods to be examined. 
Method 1 is that the father divides this cake into three equal pieces, and 
tells the children to take apiece or leave it. Method 2 is that the children 
are given the opportunity to discuss how this cake should be divided fairly 
among them, and cut it into three pieces in accordance with the conclu-
sion they agree on. Assume that they conclude to the equal division in the 
Method 2. The outcomes of Method 1 and Method 2 are totally the same, 
but the degree of freedom of choice that the society has is different. Note 
that, in Method 2, each individual may not have a power to choose prefer-
able outcomes in the opportunity. However, they do not lose the right to 
have positive possibility to achieve the outcomes in the opportunity. In our 
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framework, we view this kind of individual right as the opportunity for the 
society. This is the set of outcomes that is possible for the society or the set 
of outcomes that is not excluded by the system.
How do we rank the opportunity sets for the society? To answer this 
question, let us consider the foundation to rank the opportunity set in 
terms of individual rights. We think that degree of freedom of opportu-
nity set A in terms of the individual rights is increased by adding x not 
in A if x is preferred to every y in A by reasonable persons. But what 
kinds of people do we assume as reasonable persons? The reasonability 
of a person is built on common ideas of the society because we think 
the concept of the individual rights is based not on each individual’s 
position or situation, but on common idea of the society. To clarify this 
concept, I introduce an example. Suppose the added alternative is the 
option such as { being killed by his/her friend }. We do not think that 
adding this alternative improves the situation of individual rights even 
if we are the people who want to be killed! This is because the person, 
who wanted to be killed, is not recognized as a reasonable person by 
the society. In this way, the concept of individual rights is built on the 
common idea of the society, which is the reasonability of the person. 
In another words, the concept of individual rights is built on the set of 
preferences that reasonable persons have. Since the concept of indi-
vidual rights of each person is built on the same foundation that is the 
set of preferences of reasonable persons, the ranking of opportunity sets 
in terms of individual rights is common among the individuals. As we 
noted previously, there have been some recent attempts to formulate 
rules for judging the degrees of complete freedom of individual choice 
viewing freedom as the opportunity for the choice, such as Puppe (1996) 
and Pattanaik and Xu (1998). We incorporate these formulations into 
the concept of opportunity for the society. 
Adding to the ranking of opportunity sets, which is expressed as the 
common preference over opportunity sets, there are some attempts to 
formulate preferences over social states, which are pairs of an opportu-
nity set and an outcome. Gravel (1994, 1998) formulate preference over 
social states so that they are linked with both preference over opportu-
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nity sets and preferences over outcomes at the same time. Suzumura 
and Xu (2001, 2004) formulate preferences over social states so that it 
is compatible with axiom of Pattanaik and Xu (1990) for preferences 
over opportunity sets, Indifference, Strict Monotonicity, and Indepen-
dence. Restricting this preference to satisfy Consequentialist property 
or non-Consequentialist property, Suzumura and Xu (2001) shows some 
property of the preference over social states. 
In this paper, we call the set that consists of an opportunity set and 
an outcome as a social state. For example, social state X = (X, x) implies 
that the outcome x is selected from opportunity X. And we consider 
admissible preferences over social states using preference over oppor-
tunity sets and preference over outcomes. We introduce some simple 
axioms to connect these two preferences and consider the admissible 
preference defined over social states. In another words, we consider the 
preferences over social states, using both preferences over opportunity 
sets and preference over outcomes. The main purpose of this paper is to 
prove an impossibility theorem in our context, but the other purpose of 
this paper is to formulate admissible preference structure for opportu-
nity sets and outcomes using dual preference structure.
Due to non-universal domain property of this defined preference 
over social states, we do not get both the impossibility and the possibil-
ity results in the same condition as the classical Arrovian impossibil-
ity theorem. We introduce a new condition to overcome the problem. 
By introducing the consistency condition on social welfare function, 
we can prove the impossibility theorem under our framework. On the 
other hand, Suzumura and Xu (2004) proves an impossibility theorem 
restricting preference to satisfy Extreme Consequentialist property 
and revising the weak pairwise Pareto condition to the strong pairwise 
Pareto condition. We will show another impossibility result correspond-
ing to their result. Furthermore, they show the possibility result by 
restricting the domain of social welfare function so that there exist at 
least one Extreme Consequentialist and one Strong Consequentialist. 
Our Theorem 4 corresponds to this result.
289
Waseda Global Forum No. 6, 2009, 285–310
2  The basic notations, definitions and axioms 
2.1 Preference structure 
A possible reason for giving an intrinsic importance to freedom of 
choice is that the individual prefers choosing from a set offering more 
freedom to choosing from a set offering less freedom. This suggests the 
possibility that individual preferences are defined over pairs like (X, x) 
where x is an outcome from opportunity X. 
Let E be the set of all possible outcomes. Its elements must be in-
compatible with one another. 2E is the power set of E, the set of all sub-
sets of E. And we let OE be the set of all opportunity sets on E, OE = 2E 
\ { φ }, and let SE be the set of all social state on E, SE = {(X, x)|x ∈ X ∈ 
OE}. Social welfare functions are orderings over SE. 
Next, we consider the foundation to formulate the preference over 
social states, which will be used in this paper. To make the preference 
over social states nonschizophrenia, we must consider both preference 
over opportunity sets and preferences over outcomes. So, we consider 
three kinds of preferences in this paper, preference over outcomes, pref-
erence over opportunities and preference over social states. 
We let RE be the set of all complete, reflexive and transitive binary 
relations over E, and R be a complete and reflexive binary relation over 
OE. I and P are the symmetric and asymmetric parts of R. As we noted 
in the introduction, the foundation of R is the profile of reasonable in-
dividual preferences. If the reasonability is made by community, the 
set of reasonable preference profiles is common among the individuals. 
Thus the ranking rule is common among individuals. We suppose R is 
common among individuals. And we suppose that for any X ∈ OE there 
exists Y ∈ OE such that Y PX. 
Let R be a preference over social states. To formulate preferences 
R over social states that are consistent with both preferences over op-
portunity sets and preferences over outcomes, Gravel (1994) suggests 
some axioms that render preferences over social states sensitive to the 
different degree of freedom of choice and preference orderings over out-
comes. In its formulation, (X, x)P(Y, y) (where P is asymmetric part of R) 
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must be necessarily followed by XPY, which is Axiom 1 in Gravel (1994), 
and xPy which is Axiom 3 in Gravel (1994). In Gravel’s framework, the 
individuals who are interested in either only preferences over opportu-
nity sets, we call the individuals non-Consequentialists, or only prefer-
ences over outcomes, we call the individuals Consequentialists, are not 
allowed. However, it is natural to think that there are individuals who 
are interested in either preferences over opportunity sets or only prefer-
ences over outcomes. So, we formulate preferences R over social states 
so that they allow both individuals who only take interested in prefer-
ence over opportunity sets and individuals who are only interested in 
preferences over outcomes. To formulate nonschizophrenia preferences 
R , we only restrict preferences R so that they do not ignore the prefer-
ence over opportunity sets and the preferences over outcomes at the 
same time. 
In addition, Gravel (1994), which treats opportunity sets for an indi-
vidual, restricts SE so that for any social state (X, x), xRx′ for all outcomes x′ 
∈ X, which is Axiom 2 in Gravel (1994). Gravel (1994) asserts that,
‘...since the individual chooses from any set the option that she 
most prefers, she does not really care about hypothetical choice 
situations in which the chosen option is not the most preferred.’ 
However, in our framework that treats opportunities for the soci-
ety, an outcome x′ that is not the most preferred outcome for a certain 
individual is not excluded from possible outcomes, that is, for two social 
states (X, x) and (X, x ′ ), even if for an individual i, xPix ′ , (X, x ′ ) may 
be chosen by social choice. So, we must define preferences over social 
states under no restriction on SE. Hence, we define R over non-restrict-
ed SE. 
For given n-individual society, N is the set of individuals labeled as 
integers, N = {1, ..., n}. (R × RE)n is the n-fold Cartesian product of (R × 
RE). If 
v = ((R,Rv1), (R,Rv2), ..., (R,Rvn)) 
is an element of (R × RE)n, we call v an individual preference profile for 
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opportunities and outcomes at v. vi = (R,Rvi) is the individual preference 
ordering for opportunities and outcomes for the ith individual at v.
Next, given vi, we define the set of admissible preferences over SE . Avi is 
the set of admissible ith individual preferences over SE at vi defined by
Avi = {Ri|Ri is complete, reflexive and transitive over SE , 
∀X = (X, x), Y = (Y, y) ∈ SE, 　　 　　　  
    if  XRY  & xRvi y,  then  XRiY, 　
　　　　　　　　　   if  XPY  & xPvi y,  then  XPiY }.    
Ii and Pi are the symmetric and asymmetric parts of Ri. 
Ai is the set of all admissible preferences over SE as, 
Ai =    ∪    Avi .
vi∈(R×RE)
Let U be the set of all admissible preference profiles on n-individual.
  n
U =  Π  Ai
   i=1
and an element of U, denoted by u, will be called an admissible profile 
and, 
u = (Ru1 , Ru2 , ..., Run)
Rui is the ith preference over SE at u. 
By the definition of Ai, Ai is not the set of all complete, transitive 
binary relation over SE. We call this as non-universal domain property. 
Because of non-universal domain property, we do not get an impossibil-
ity theorem as classical Arrovian impossibility theorem. To overcome 
this problem, we use Remark 1. 
Remark 1 ∀X = (X, x), Y = (Y, y) ∈ SE where x ≠ y and ∀i, there exists Ri, 
R′i and R′′i ∈ Ai such that 
(1) XPi Y, 
(2) XI ′i Y and 
(3) YP ′′i X. 
By the definition of Avi , this remark obviously holds. We will omit 
the proof. Remark 1 claims that for any pair of social states where each 
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outcome is not same, all binary relations are admissible. Note that we 
do not get the universal domain property in spite of Remark 1. Then 
we do not get an impossibility theorem only by Remark1. To complete 
the proof, we will introduce another condition about social welfare func-
tions. Consistency condition will be introduced later to overcome this 
problem. Without the consistency condition, we do not get an impossi-
bility theorem. Our main theorem is an impossibility theorem of social 
welfare functions over U with the consistency condition. 
2.2 Social welfare function and its restriction 
A social welfare function (· ) is a binary relation defined on U. (· ) 
and (· ) are asymmetric and symmetric part of (· ). We introduce some 
restrictions on a social welfare function. One of the most important re-
strictions on social welfare functions is the decisiveness condition, speci-
fying which groups of individuals have a deciding voice on which issues. 
We use the weakly, globally pairwise decisive condition. Given X, Y ∈SE, 
a set S ⊆ N is weakly, globally pairwise decisive for X against Y if 
(∀u ∈ U, i) (i ∈ S → XPuiY) → X (u) Y. 
From now on, we will use XPDSY to denote this condition. If S is 
weakly, globally pairwise decisive both for X against Y and for Y against 
X, we say S is weakly, globally decisive between X and Y. 
We now use our decisiveness language to introduce two restrictions 
on social welfare functions that have been used in impossibility proofs. 
If the set of all individuals, N = {1, 2, ..., n}, is weakly, globally decisive 
between every pair of alternatives, we say that the social welfare func-
tion satisfies weak pairwise Pareto condition. And if no set of just a 
single individual is weakly, globally decisive between every pair of al-
ternatives, we say that the social welfare function satisfies the general 
nondictatorship condition. 
Next we introduce another class of conditions. The social welfare 
function satisfies the pairwise independence condition if the social wel-
fare function over any two alternatives {X, Y } ⊂ SE depends only on the 
profile of individual preferences over the same alternatives. Formally, 
for any pair of alternatives {X, Y } ⊂ SE and for any pair of preference 
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profiles u, u′ ∈ U with the property that, for every i ∈ N, 
XRuiY ⇔ XRu′i Y and YRuiX ⇔ YRu′i X 
we have that 
X (u) Y ⇔ X (u′) Y 
and 
Y (u) X ⇔ Y (u′) X. 
Finally we introduce a new axiom. If a group is excluded from the 
decisive group in choosing a certain social state, the group is excluded 
from the decisive group in the case that they like to choose a social 
state with the same outcome and more R-preferred (as noted previ-
ously, that is common preference) opportunity set. Formally, if S ⊆ N 
is not decisive for Y = (Y, y) ∈ SE against X = (X, x) ∈ SE, then S is not 
decisive for Y * = (Y *, y) against X if Y *PY. We call this condition as the 
consistency condition. The consistency condition can be interpreted as a 
legitimacy of social welfare functions. There are two interpretations of 
the legitimacy. One is the interpretation of legitimacy that social wel-
fare functions do not allow overambitious individuals. It is natural to 
think that once the social welfare function does not give deciding power 
on the issues to a certain group, the (legitimate) social welfare function 
does not give any deciding power to the group even if the group is more 
ambitious than the case the group is not given the deciding power. Fur-
thermore, the overambition comes from more R-preferred opportunity. 
Because R is common among all individuals in the society, all individu-
als think that the group is overambitious. How does the legitimate 
social welfare function give the deciding power although all individuals 
think that the group is overambitious? The other interpretation of le-
gitimacy is based on the property of R. In Pattanaik and Xu (1990,1998), 
the preference R represents the inclusion relation, that is, XRY means 
Y ⊆ X. On the other hand, the fact a certain group is not decisive for (Y, y) 
against (X, x) means that the group do not have the power to choose the 
outcome y from the opportunity Y against to choose the outcome x from 
the opportunity X. It is intuitive to assume that the group does not have 
the power to choose the same y from more extended opportunity set Y * 
because the group do not have the power in the narrower opportunity 
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set,which is Y ,than Y *. 
We describe a rights structure as the opportunity sets. But there 
exists another aspect of a rights structure such as who have the power 
to choose an outcome from the opportunity set. Consistency condition is 
the condition that give the social welfare function a consistency how it 
gives the people the choosing power. 
As noted previously, since we adopt U as the domain of social wel-
fare function, we do not get the impossibility theorem without this 
condition as the same condition of the classical Arrovian impossibility 
theorem. 
3  An impossibility and a possibility with consistency condition 
In our context discussed in the previous chapter, we can prove the 
following theorems. Theorem 1 is an impossibility theorem with the do-
main U and the consistency condition in the case where n is finite. 
Theorem 1 There is no social welfare function (· ): U → R satisfying
(1) 3 ≤ n < ∞, 
(2) each (· ) is complete, reflexive, and transitive, 
(3) the pairwise independence condition, 
(4) the weak pairwise Pareto condition, 
(5) the general nondictatorship condition, 
(6) the consistency condition. 
Theorem 1 is an impossibility result in the context of extended pref-
erences over social states determined by opportunity sets and outcomes. 
We introduce the consistency condition contrasting to the classical 
Arrovian impossibility theorem. When we describe a rights structure 
as opportunity sets, the social planner needs to consider who has the 
power to choose an outcome from the opportunity set. It is natural to 
think that a social welfare function must have consistency as to how 
the people are given the power to choose an outcome. The consistency 
condition is dispensable in this sense. 
Usually, it is said that possibility results come from similar atti-
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tudes of the individuals such as possibility results depending on single-
peaked individual preferences. And it is said that impossibility results 
come from diverse attitudes of individuals such that Arrovian impos-
sibility theorem greatly depends on its universal domain property. In 
my context, I introduce a common preference over the opportunity sets 
based on common idea. We formulate the preferences over social state 
depending on this common preference R. So, the preferences over social 
states formulated in our context partially reflect this similar preference 
R. In this sense, the preferences over social states in our context have 
a kind of similarity among individuals. However, Theorem 1 shows the 
impossibility result that it can only make a decision that is made by a 
general dictator. One of the critics that are discussed often against the 
classical Arrovian impossibility theorem is its universal domain prop-
erty of a social welfare function for individual preferences. Theorem 1 
shows that even if the assumptions of the classic Arrovian impossibility 
theorem are revised to the extent that they are without universal do-
main so that they have partially similar attitudes as in our context, we 
prove the impossibility. 
Related to the similarity of attitudes among individuals, the other 
critics against the classical Arrovian impossibility theorem is the ab-
solute dependence of social welfare function on the individual subjec-
tive preferences. Accepting this critics, we also treat R to be based on 
socially accepted common sense. By formulating preferences over social 
states so that they consider R, which is objective criteria, we can formu-
late the social welfare function depending on objective criteria. In this 
paper, we do not specify R, the preference over opportunity sets. We 
just say that it is common. I think it is appropriate to assume, in some 
situations, expansions of opportunity sets do not necessarily make an 
agent better off. But in some papers such as Pattanaik and Xu (1990), 
they say it makes an agent better off. So, I built the model in a general 
case.  
If the conditions of Theorem 1 are revised only to the extent that 
N is assume to be infinite, a social welfare function (· ) satisfying such 
revised conditions is obtained. 
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Theorem 2 There is a social welfare function (· ): U → R satisfying such 
conditions.
(1) n = ∞, 
(2) each (· ) is complete, reflexive, and transitive, 
(3) the pairwise independence condition, 
(4) the weak pairwise Pareto condition, 
(5) the general nondictatorship condition, 
(6) the consistency condition. 
Theorem 2 is a possibility theorem in the case that infinite N is 
assumed. This result is the same as the classical Arrovian possibility 
theorem in case that infinite N is assumed. 
4  Impossibility without consistency condition 
Repeating for emphasis, we do not get the impossibility theorem as 
the same conditions of classical Arrovian impossibility theorem if we 
adopt U to the domain of social welfare function. To prove the impos-
sibility theorem without our consistency condition, we adopt Suzumura 
and Xu (2004)’s idea that restricts U to Extreme Consequentialist1 one 
and revises our weak pairwise Pareto condition to the stronger one. 
Next, we rewrite this idea in our framework. We say the individual i is 
partial Extreme Consequentialist if the set of admissible preferences of 
ith individual over SE at given vi ∈ (R × RE) is 
Apvi = {Ri|Ri is complete, reflexive and transitive over SE, 
∀X = (X, x), Y = (Y, y) ∈ SE, 　　　　　
if  XRY  &  xRviy, then XRiY, 　
if  XPY  &  xPviy, then XPiY  　  
　　　　　　　　　  if  xIviy,  then XIiY}.  　　　　　
Apvi is formulated revising Extreme Consequentialist in Suzumura and 
Xu (2004) to be consistent with our Avi . Because we do not allow the indi-
viduals who ignore both preference over opportunity sets and preference 
over outcomes at the same time when outcomes are discrete, our formula-
tion of partial Extreme Consequentialist is different from Suzumura and 
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Xu (2004)’s one. 
Let Api is the set of all admissible partial Extreme Consequential-
ist’s preferences such as 
Api =    ∪    Apvi .
vi∈(R×RE)
Let Up be the set of all admissible preference profiles of partial Ex-
treme Consequentialist on n-individual such as 
  n
Up =  Π  Api .
   i=1
Note that this partial Extreme Consequential individuals’ prefer-
ences set does not satisfy the universal domain property, so the domain 
of social welfare function of the impossibility theorem with these pref-
erences is not the same as classical Arrovian impossibility theorem 
though we assume consequential individuals as the same as Arrow’s 
one. We will state Remark 2 without the proof. 
Remark 2 ∀X = (X, x), Y = (Y, y) ∈ SE where x ≠ y and ∀i, there exists Ri, 
R′i and R′′i ∈ Api such that 
(1) XPiY, 
(2) XI ′iY and 
(3) YP ′′i X. 
Theorem 3 is an impossibility theorem of the social welfare function 
over Up in the case that we adopt strong Pareto condition without the 
consistency condition. 
To define strong pairwise Pareto condition, we define strongly, glob-
ally pairwise decisive condition. For any X, Y ∈SE, u ∈ U, the set S ⊆ N 
is strongly, globally pairwise decisive for X against Y if 
(∀i)(i ∈ S → XPuiY) → X u Y, and 
(∀i)(i ∈ S → XIuiY) → X ~u Y. 
And if the set of all individuals, N = {1, 2, ..., n}, is strongly, globally 
decisive between every pair of alternatives. We say that the social wel-
fare function satisfies strong pairwise Pareto condition. 
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The following theorem corresponds to Theorem 1 in Suzumura and 
Xu (2004). 
Theorem 3 There is no social welfare function  (· ): Up → R satisfying
(1) 3 ≤ n < ∞, 
(2) each (· ) is complete, reflexive, and transitive, 
(3) the pairwise independence condition, 
(4) the strong pairwise Pareto condition, 
(5) the general nondictatorship condition. 
Note that the domain Up of the social welfare function of this theo-
rem is narrower than that of the social welfare function under Extreme 
Consequentialists’ (Suzumura and Xu (2004)) society. Usually, the 
impossibility is found if there is a diversity of attitudes among individu-
als. We can say that we prove impossibility even if Extreme Consequen-
tialist attitude is restricted to our partial Extreme Consequentialist 
domain Up. Repeated for emphasis, this impossibility result comes from 
restricting the domain of the social welfare function to that of partial 
Extreme Consequentialists deferring from that of our main theorem, 
which allow Consequentialist and non-Consequentialist, and revise the 
weak pairwise Pareto condition to strong one. 
5   Possibility by assuring the existence of partial Extreme 
Consequentialist and Strong Consequentialist
Suzumura and Xu (2004) also shows that if there exist at least one 
Extreme Consequentialist and one Strong Consequentialist2, there ex-
ists an social welfare function that satisfies classical Arrovian condi-
tion. In Theorem 4, we rewrite this result in our framework that allows 
the existences of non-Consequentialists whose preferences are in U. To 
prove the possibility, we define Strong Consequentialist in our frame-
work. We say the individual i is a Strong Consequentialist if the set of 
admissible ith individual preferences over SE at vi ∈ (R × RE) is 
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Amvi = {Ri|Ri is complete, reflexive and transitive over SE, 
　　　　　　　　∀X = (X, x), Y = (Y, y) ∈ SE, 
　　　　　　　　　　if  xIviy,  then  XRiY if and only if XRY, 
　　　　　　　　　　if  xPviy,  then  XPiY.} 
Let Ami is the set of all admissible Strong Consequentialist’s prefer-
ences such as 
Ami =    ∪    Amvi .
vi∈(R×RE)
To assure the existence of one partial Extreme Consequentialist 
and one Strong Consequentialist, we assume individual 1 is a partial 
Extreme Consequentialist and individual 2 is a Strong Consequential-
ist. Then we formulate the domain of social welfare function. 
Let Upm be the set of all admissible preference profiles such that 
individual 1 is partial Extreme Consequentialist and individual 2 is 
Strong Consequentialist, that is , 
Upm = Ap1 × Am2 × A3×, ..., × An. 
Theorem 4 is a possibility result with the domain Upm. Noting pre-
viously, we allow non-Consequentialists whose preferencere are in Ai 
where i≥3, adding to one partial Extreme Consequentialist and one 
Strong Consequentialist contrasting to Suzumura and Xu (2004). In our 
framework, the other individual except for 1 and 2 may be partial Ex-
treme Consequentialist or Strong Consequentialist or non-Consequen-
tialist. 
Theorem 4 There exists an social welfare function (· ): Upm → R satisfying
(1) 2 ≤ n < ∞, 
(2) each (· ) is complete, reflexive, and transitive, 
(3) the pairwise independence condition, 
(4) the weak pairwise Pareto condition, 
(5) the general nondictatorship condition, 
(6) the consistency condition. 
Restricting U to assure the existences of both a partial Extreme 
Consequentialist and a Strong Consequentialist, we can prove the pos-
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sibility theorem. 
6  Concluding remarks 
We proved an impossibility theorem in our framework that allows 
the existence of both individuals who are interested only in outcomes 
and individuals who are interested only in opportunities (Theorem 1). 
We introduce the consistency condition adding to the classical Arrovian 
impossibility theorem. Differing from the classical one that treat social 
choice among outcomes, in our framework that treat both choice among 
chosen opportunities and choice from the opportunity, we have to con-
sider how the individuals are given the power to choose the outcome by 
social welfare function. The consistency condition is a minimal condi-
tion that gives a legitimacy how the social welfare function gives the 
choosing power to the individuals. Without the consistency condition, 
we do not have possibility or impossibly results generally. The problem 
whether we can prove the impossibility without the consistency condi-
tion or not is left open. 
Restricting the domain of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 to that of par-
tial Extreme Consequentialist, we can prove the impossibility theorem 
such as Theorem 3 as the same as Suzumura and Xu (2004). However, 
I think it is natural that we allow the existence of both type of individu-
als, which are Consequentialist and non-Consequentialist. So, I think it 
is valuable to prove impossibility under this co-existing society. 
Theorem 4 is a possibility theorem with the domain that assure the 
existence of both partial Extreme Consequentialist and Strong Con-
sequentialist. In this framework we can prove possibility without the 
consistency condition. However, the domain of this theorem is more 
restrictive than that of Theorem 1 because individual 1 is restricted to 
a Extreme Consequentialist and individual 2 is restricted to a Strong 
Consequentialist. To get the results in the framework that allow Con-
sequentialists and non-Consequentialists, it seems that the consistency 
condition is not dispensable, because for some two social states, all 
individual’s preference is same by definition of R (so universal domain 
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property is not satisfied). It may be true that our framework that allow 
both Consequentialist and non-Consequentialist is boundary between 
possibility and impossibility. 
7  Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 1 
Let F be the set of all sets of individuals that are weakly, globally 
pairwise decisive between every pair of alternatives. 
[Step1] If A ∈ F and A ⊆ B, then B ∈ F. 
This is immediate from the definition of weakly, globally pairwise 
decisiveness. 
[Step2] If （·） satisfies the weak pairwise Pareto condition, N ∈ F. 
The weak pairwise Pareto condition is precisely the statement that 
N is weakly, globally pairwise decisive between every part of alternatives.
[Step3] φ /∈ F. 
Assume U contains a profile u such that for some X, Y, XPuiY for all 
i ∈ N and everyone in φ strictly prefers Y to X. By weak pairwise Pare-
to condition, X （u） Y. Thus φ is not weakly, globally pairwise decisive 
for Y against X and so φ /∈ F. 
[Step4] If A,B ∈ F, A ∩ B ∈ F. 
Let u be any profile with restricted orderings as follows 
A ∩ B : XY, 
N − (A ∩ B) : [XY]. 
where X = (X, x) , Y = (Y, y). A ∩ B : XY means XPA∩BY. N − (A ∩ B) : [XY] 
means that we allow any relation between X and Y for N − (A ∩ B). In 
going to one profile to a related one, we suppose this bracketed relation 
remain unchanged. For example, if at u′ ∈ U we have 
i : [XY], 
we are allowing any relation between X and Y. If u′′ ∈ U is constructed 
by inserting Z and we write 
i : [XY]Z, 
then it is understood that the unspecified relation between X and Y is 
the same for i at both u′ and u′′ . 
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Next, we pick up Z = (Z, z) with z ≠ x and y ≠ z, and consider a pro-
file u′ with orderings 
A ∩ B : XZY, 
  A − B : [XY]Z, 
  N − A : Z[XY]. 
The existence of these orderings is given by Remark 1. Since A ∈ F, X (u′) 
Z, and since B ∈ F, Z (u′) Y. By transitivity X (u′ ) Y, and independence 
of irrelevant alternatives then gives X (u) Y. Since X and Y were arbi-
trary, A ∩ B ∈ F. 
[Step5] By Step 1,2,3 and 4, F is a filter. 
[Step6] If A ⊆ N, either A ∈ F or N − A ∈ F. 
We first show that 
¬YPDN−AX → XPDAZ   ∀Z /∈ {X, Y}.　　　　　　　(1) 
Consider any profile u with 
A : XZ, 
N − A : [XZ]. 
By definition of OE we can pick up Y* = (Y, y) such that Y *PY and 
Y *PZ. By ¬YPDN−AX and the consistency condition, ¬Y*PDN−AX. Then 
we can pick up a profile u′ such that 
A : [XY*], 
N − A : Y*X 
and X (u′ ) Y*. Finally, look at a profile u′′ with 
A : [XY*]Z, 
N − A : Y*[XZ]. 
By independence, X (u′ ) Y* implies X (u′′ ) Y*. By the Pareto condi-
tion, Y* (u′′ ) Z. By transitivity, X (u′′ ) Z. Another application of indepen-
dence yields X (u) Z. So XPDAZ. 
Similarly, it can be shown that 
¬YPDN−AX → ZPDAY   for all  Z /∈ {X, Y}.　　　　　　 (2) 
Now suppose N − A /∈ F. Then for some X, Y ∈ SE, ¬YPDN−AX. By (1) 
and (2), 
XPDAZ  and  ZPDAY. 　　　　　　　　　　(3) 
Then, ¬ZPDN−AX, so by (1) 
XPDAY.　　　　　　　　　　　　　 (4) 
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(3) also yields ¬YPDN−AZ, and another application of (1) gives 
ZPDAX.　　　　　　　　　　　　　 (5) 
Thus ¬XPDN−AZ, and (2) on this gives 
YPDAX. 　　　　　　　　　　　　　(6) 
Finally, from ¬ZPDN−AX and using (2), we get 
YPDAZ. 　　　　　　　　　　　　　(7) 
Combining (3)-(7), we see A is decisive between every pair of dis-
tinct alternatives in {X, Y, Z}. Next, we will show that A is decisive be-
tween every pair of alternatives. Pick up W and Q such that {W, Q} ∩ {X, 
Y, Z} = φ. By (1), we have XPDAW. This implies ¬WPDAX. By another 
application of (2), we have QPDAW. We see that A is decisive between 
every pair of alternatives, i.e., A ∈ F. 
[Step7] F is an ultra filter. 
By Step 1,2,3,4,5 and 6, F is ultra filter. 
[Step8] There exists an individual who is a dictator. 
Since N is finite, and F is an ultrafilter, F has a singleton base {i}. 
Then, {i} is a general dictator. 
Proof of Theorem 2 
Since N is infinite, there exist free ultrafilters on N. Let U be one of 
such filters. Given profile u, define the relation (u) by 
X (u)Y  iff  {i|XPuiY} ∈ U. 
We define X  (u)Y as ¬X (u)Y. 
[Step1] (u) is complete, reflexive and transitive. 
First, we show completeness. Since Rui is complete over SE, either 
XPuiY or YRui X must occur for any X, Y, i. This means either X (u)Y or 
Y (u) X must occur for any X, Y over SE. Then X (u)Y or Y (u) X must 
occur for any X, Y on SE. Thus (u) is complete. 
By reflexivity of Ri, XRuiX. Then, ¬X (u) X. Thus X (u) X. So (u)  is 
reflexive. 
Next, we show (u)  is transitive. Suppose X (u) Y and Y (u) Z. Note 
that {i|YPuiX} /∈ U and {i|ZPuiY} /∈ U. We show X (u)  Z. By the prop-
erty of ultrafilter and transitivity of Rui , {i|XRuiY} ∈ U and {i|YRuiZ} ∈ U. 
By another application of property of ultrafilter and transitivity of Rui , 
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{i|XRuiY} ∩ {i|YRuiZ} = {i|XRuiY, YRuiZ and XRuiZ} ∈ U. Hence ¬Z (u) X. 
Thus X (u)  Z. 
[Step2] (u)  satisfies the pairwise independence condition. 
 (u)  is determined only by Rui for i ∈ U. Then if u|(X, Y) = u′|(X, Y), 
obviously preferences over X, Y are the same for any i ∈ U between u 
and u′ . Thus X (u) Y ⇐⇒ X (u′) Y. 
[Step3] (u) satisfies the consistency condition. 
We prove the consistency condition by proving the contrapositive of 
the consistency condition. Suppose Y*PDAX, it follows that A ∈ U. Then, 
if YPu′i X for any i ∈ A, Y （u′） X. Thus YPDAX. 
[Step4] The social welfare functional (u) satisfies weak pairwise Pareto 
condition. 
Since U is a filter, N ∈ U. By definition of (u), for any X, Y, if XPuiY 
for any i ∈ N, XPuiY. Thus (u) satisfies weak pairwise Pareto condition. 
[Step5] The social welfare function  (u) satisfies nondictatorship condition.
Since U is free ultrafilter on N, U does not have a singleton base. 
Then, nondictatorship condition is satisfied. 
Proof of Theorem 3 
We can prove Theorem 3 as that same as the proof of Theorem 1 ex-
cept for STEP 6. To complete the proof, we give another proof of Step 6 
for Theorem 3 as Step 6’. 
[Step6’] If A ⊆ N, either A ∈ F or N − A ∈ F. 
Suppose X = (X, x), Y = (Y, y), Z = (Z, z) ∈ SE. We first show that 
¬YPDN−AX → XPDAZ ∀Z such that z ≠ y.　　　　　　 (8) 
Consider any profile u with 
A : XZ, 
N − A : [XZ]. 
By ¬YPDN − AX, we can pick up the profile u′ such that 
A : [XY], 
N − A : YX. 
and X (u′ ) Y. 
Look at a profile u′′ with 
A : [XY]Z, 
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N − A : Y[XZ]. 
By independence, X (u′ ) Y implies X (u′′ ) Y. By the Pareto condition, 
Y (u′′ ) Z. By transitivity, X (u′′ ) Z. Another application of independence 
yields X (u) Z. So XPDAZ. 
Similarly, it can be shown that 
¬YPDN −AX → ZPDAY   ∀Z such that z ≠ x　　　　　　 (9) 
Now suppose N − A /∈ F. Then for some X, Y ∈ SE, ¬YPDN−AX. By (8) 
and (9), 
XPDAZ   ∀Z such that z ≠ y, and ZPDAY   ∀Z.　　　　　 (10) 
Then, ¬ZPDN−AX, so by (8) 
XPDAY.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 (11) 
(10) also yields ¬YPDN−AZ, and another application of (8) gives 
ZPDAX   ∀Z such that z ≠ x. 　　　　　　　　　(12) 
Thus ¬XPDN −AZ, and (9) on this gives 
YPDAX.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 (13) 
From ¬ZPDN −AX, we use (9) to get 
YPDAZ   ∀Z such that z ≠ y. 　　　　　　　　　(14) 
Next, pick W = (W,w) and Q = (Q, q) such that w ≠ x, w ≠ y, q ≠ x, 
and q ≠ y. Using the second part of (10), we have WPDAY. This implies 
¬YPDN −AW. By another application of (8), 
WPDAQ. 　　　　　　　　　　　　　 (15) 
Next, we will show that A is decisive for any alternatives in SE. Pick 
any T = (T, t) and V = (V, v). 
For outcome t, we have the following cases, 
case 1. t = x, 
case 2. t = y, and 
case 3. t ≠ x, t ≠ y. 
Similarly, for outcome v, we have the following cases 
case a. v = x, 
case b. v = y, and 
case c. v ≠ x, v ≠ y. 
[case 1-a]: t = x and v = x 
By the definition of Up, TIui V for any i ∈ N and for any u ∈ Up. Then 
TPDAV. 
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[case 1-b]: t = x, and v = y 
Suppose for some u ∈ Up, TPuiV for any i ∈ A. We will show TPDAV. 
By the definition of Up, TIuiX and VIuiY. By the transitivity of Ri, XPuiY. 
And by the strong the Pareto condition, T ~(u) X and V ~(u) Y. Since X 
(u) Y by (11), by the transitivity, we have T (u) V. Because u is arbitrary, 
TPDAV. 
[case 1-c] t = x, v ≠ x, and v ≠ y 
Suppose for some u ∈ Up, TPuiV for any i ∈ A. We will show TPDAV. 
By the definition of Up, TIuiX for any i. By the transitivity of Ri, XPuiV 
for any i ∈ A. And by the strong the Pareto condition, T ~(u) X. Using (10), 
and the transitivity of (· ), T (u) V. Because u is arbitrary, TPDAV. 
[case 2-a] t = y, and v = x 
Using (13), we can prove TPDAV as the same as the case 1-b. 
[case 2-b] t = y, and v = y 
We can prove TPDAV as the same as the case 1-a. 
[case 2-c] t = y, v ≠ x, and v ≠ y 
Using (14), we can prove TPDAV as the same as the case 1-c. 
[case 3-a] t ≠ x, t ≠ y, and v = x 
Using (12), we can prove TPDAV as the same as the case 1-c. 
[case 3-b] t ≠ x, t ≠ y, and v = y 
Using (10), we can prove TPDAV as the same as the case 1-c. 
[case 3-c] 
[case 3-c-1] t ≠ x, t ≠ y, v ≠ x, v ≠ y, and u ≠ v 
Using (15), we can prove TPDAV. 
[case 3-c-2] t ≠ x, t ≠ y, v ≠ x, v ≠ y, and t = v 
We can prove TPDAV as the same as case 1-a. 
Thus A is decisive for any alternatives. 
Proof of Theorem 4.: 
By the definition of Upm, individual 1 is a partial Extreme Conse-
quentialist and individual 2 is a Strong Consequentialist. First, we 
construct social welfare function. For a profile u ∈ Upm, we denote the 
preference over outcomes for individual i as Rui For all X = (X, x), Y = (Y, 
y) ∈ SE, and for all u ∈ Upm if xPu2y then X (u) Y, if xIu2y then X (u) Y if 
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and only if XRu1Y, and if yPu2x then Y (u) X. 
[Step1] (u) is complete, reflexive and transitive. 
Since R2 over E is complete, and R1 and R2 are complete on SE, (u) 
is complete over SE. By the completeness of (u), we have X (u) X. 
Next, we show the transitivity of (u). Suppose X (u) Y, and Y (u) 
Z. We show X (u) Z. By the definition of social welfare function, we can 
not have yPu2 x. By the completeness of R, we must have either xIu2y or 
xPu2y. 
Case 1: xIu2y  
By the definition of social welfare function, we have XRu1Y. By, Y (u) 
Z, we can not have zPu2y. So we have two subcases. 
Case1.1: yIu2z 
Since Y (u) Z, we have YRu1Z. By the transitivity of R1, we have XRu1Z. 
And by the transitivity of R2, we have xIu2z. Then by the definition of social 
welfare function, X (u) Z if and only if XRu1Z. Hence X (u) Z.
Case1.2: yPu2z 
Since xIu2y and yPu2z, by the transitivity, we have xPu2z Then by the 
definition of social welfare function, we have X (u) Z. 
Case2: xPu2y. 
By the definition of R2, we have XPu2Y. Since Y (u) Z, we have 
yRu2z. By the transitivity of R2, we have xPu2z Then XRu2Z. Hence X (u) 
Z. we completed the proof of transitivity. 
[Step2] (u) satisfies the pairwise independence condition. 
Pick up any profile u′ and u′′ in Upm such that for X, Y ∈ SE and for 
all individual i, XRu′ iY if and only if XRu′′ iY. Suppose we have X (u′ ) Y 
and Y (u′′ ) X. Since X (u′ ) Y, we have either xIu′ 2 y or xPu′ 2 y. And since Y 
(u′′ ) X, we have either yIu′′ 2x or yPu′′ 2x. 
Case 1: xIu′ 2 y and yIu′′ 2 x. 
Because X (u′ ) Y, we have XRu′1Y. Because Y (u′′ ) X, we have YRu′′ 1 X. 
this is a contradiction. 
Case 2: xIu′ 2 y and yPu′′ 2x. 
Pick up X, Y such that XPY. We have XPu′ 2Y and YPu′′ 2X. This is a 
contradiction. 
We can prove the other two cases similarly. 
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[Step3] A group is decisive between every pair of distinct alternatives if 
and only if both the individual 1 and 2 belong to the group 
We first show the necessity part. Suppose a group S such that {1, 2} 
⊆ S is not decisive for X = (X, x) against Y = (Y, y). Then there exists a 
profile u ∈ Upm such that XPu1Y, XPu2Y, and Y (u) X. This contradict to 
the definition of (u). 
Next we show the sufficiency part. Suppose a group S such that {1, 
2} ≠ S is decisive between every pair of distinct alternatives. We have 
three cases. 
Case 1: {1} /∈ S, and {2} ∈ S. 
Pick up any X = (X, x) and Y such that x ≠ y. Then there exists a 
profile u′ ∈ Upm such that YPu′ 1X, yPu′ 1x, XPu′ 2Y, and yIu′ 2x. By definition 
of (u), we have Y (u′ ) X. This contradicts to decisiveness of S. 
Case 2: {1} ∈ S, and {2}  /∈ S. 
Pick up any X = (X, x) and Y such that x ≠ y. 
Then there exists a profile u′′ ∈ Upm such that YPu′′ 1X, XPu′′ 2Y, and 
yPu′ 2x. By definition of (u), we have Y (u′′ ) X. This contradicts to deci-
siveness of S. 
Case 3: {1} /∈ S, and {2} /∈ S. 
It is obvious that the decisiveness of S contradicts to the definition 
of (u). 
[Step4] (u) satisfies the consistency condition. 
By Step 3, the group is decisive between every pair of alternatives 
if and only if {1, 2} belongs to the group. Then, the other groups of this 
decisive group are not decisive between every pair of alternatives. Sup-
pose S ⊆ N is not decisive for X against Y. Because S is not decisive be-
tween every pair of distinct alternatives, S is not decisive for Y* = (Y *, 
y) against X = (X, x) such that Y*PY. Thus the consistency condition is 
satisfied. 
[Step5] The social welfare functional (u) satisfies weak pairwise Pareto 
condition. 
By Step 3, a group is decisive if and only if both individual 1 and in-
dividual 2 belong to the group. Then the group N, which includes both 1 
and 2, is decisive for any alternatives. Then weak pairwise Pareto con-
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dition is satisfied. 
[Step6] The social welfare function (u) satisfies nondictatorship condition.
By Step 3, a group is decisive if and only if both individual 1 and in-
dividual 2 belong to the group. Then no set of just a single individual is 
weakly, globally decisive between every pair of alternatives.
　　　　　　　　　
* 1-21-1, Nishi-Waseda Shinjuku-ku Tokyo 169-0051, Japan (e-mail: y-tatsumi@aoni.
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1 Extreme Cosequentialist (Suzumura and Xu (2001, 2004)) is defined as follows An in-
dividual i ∈ N is said to be a Extreme Consequentialist if for all (X, x), (Y, x) ∈ SE, it is 
true that (X, x) Ii (Y, x).
2 They formulate Strong Consequentialist preferences such that Suzumura and Xu 
(2001,2004): An individual i ∈ N is said to be a Strong Consequentialist if, 
 ∀ (X, x), (Y, y) ∈ SE,
 if ({x}, x) Ii ({y}, y) then # X ≥ #Y iff (X, x) Ri (Y, y), and
 if ({x}, x) Pi ({y}, y), then (X, x) Pi (Y, y).
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